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INTRODUCTION
"Do you all feel hyped up to move on some white people? You all
want to fluck somebody up? There goes a white boy; go get him. "' With
that, a group of about ten black teenagers in Kenosha, Wisconsin, set
upon Gregory Riddick, a fourteen-year-old white boy. The group beat
Riddick and stole his athletic shoes. Gregory Riddick remained comatose
for four days and may well have suffered permanent brain damage
At the ensuing trial, some witnesses testified that Todd Mitchell, the
young man who uttered the inciting words, did not actually take part in
the beating. Indeed, he tried to stop it and eventually sought police
officers to intervene? The jury nonetheless convicted Mitchell as a party
to the crime of felony aggravated battery, an offense punishable in
Wisconsin by a two-year sentence A short time later, Judge Jerold
Breitenbach sentenced Todd Mitchell to four years incarceration-two
years for the battery and an additional two years because the attack was
racially motivated and, as such, was a violation of Wisconsin's penalty
enhancement statute.5
'Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. 1992).
SMarcia Coyle, High Court to Examine State Hate-Crme Statute; Does It Clash
with the First Amendment?, NAT'L L.J., April 26, 1993, at 1. The black men had recently
seen the film 'Mississippi Burning" and were discussing a scene in which white men
attack a praying black child. Id.
3 Bill Lueders, "Satan's" Victim Says: Don't Punish Him For Hateful Ideas,
SACRAMENTO BEE, April 28, 1993, at B7.
' See Brief of Respondent at 1, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No.
92-515).
-'WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1989-90). The statute mandates as follows:
Penalty; crimes committed against certain people or property.
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying
crime are increased as provided in sub. (2):
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948.
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime in par. (a)
is committed or selects the property which is damaged or otherwise
affected by the crime under par. (a) because of the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or
the owner or occupant of that property.
(2) (a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor
other than a Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000
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"Come on, let's get it on you faggot queer,"6 Joshua H.7 yelled,
though he barely knew his neighbor, William Kiley, a homosexual man.
There were, however, bad feelings between the H. family and Kiley after
a dog owned by one of Kiley's tenants bit Mrs. H. and had to be put to
sleep.' Kiley would later complain that, from that point on, the H. family
persecuted him because of his sexual orientation. Kiley spoke with an
attorney who told him that any legal action would lack force without
evidence.9 Kiley determined to get proof, and he succeeded on June 11,
1991. On that day, he aimed a video camera at his property and began
watering the lawn. After some friction between Kiley and Joshua and
Joshua's family, Joshua pummeled and kicked Kiley, calling him
"faggot," "punk," and "queer." Kiley never struck back, but his camera
captured the attack. The State of California then prosecuted Joshua in
juvenile court for the beating and added a charge under California's bias-
crimes law." Joshua was convicted of both charges.
and the revised maximum period of imprisonment is one year in the county
jail
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A
misdemeanor, the penalty increase under this section changes the status of
the crime to a felony and the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the
revised maximum period of imprisonment is 2.years.
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is a felony, the maximum
fine prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than
$5,000 and the maximum period of imprisonment prescribed by law for the
crime may be increased by not more than 5 years.
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable
for the underlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a
special verdict as to all of the issues specified in sub. (1).
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a
conviction for that crime.
6 People v. Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 294 (Ct. App. 1993).
The California court did not refer to the family's actual last name, presumably
because the defendant, Joshua, was a minor. Id.
2rd.
9 1d.
0 CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.7 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993) makes punishable the
following-
any crime which is not made punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
... if the crime is committed against the person or property of another for the
purpose of intimidating or interfering with that other person's free exercise or
enjoyment of any right secured to him by the constitution or laws of this state
or by the Constitution or laws of the United States and because of the other
person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, gender, or
sexual orientation, under any of the following circumstances, which shall be
1993-94]
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"We didn't have this problem until those niggers moved in next to us.
I ought to shoot that black mother fucker. I ought to kick his black
ass. -11 David Wyant, his wife, and some relatives rented a campsite at
the Alum Creek State Park in Ohio. Their neighbors in the camping area
were Jerry White and his girlfriend, Patricia McGowan, who are black.'
On June 2, 1989, White complained to park officials about loud music
from L-18, the neighboring campsite that Wyant had rented. The park
personnel asked Wyant to turn off his radio, and he did so-for less than
a half hour. He then turned the radio on again and loudly yelled racially
derogatory remarks and threats toward White and McGowan. 3 Hearing
the tirade, White and McGowan informed officials and left the park
Authorities charged Wyant with one count of ethnic intimidation, and he
was subsequently convicted. 4
"JeW boy.... Die, Jew boy."" John Daly was Jewish and he was
rebellious. Rejecting both his family and his heritage, he joined a group
of "skinheads," an anti-Semitic organization. 6 He eventually learned
that his new associates held their virulent intolerance more closely than
any loyalty to Daly. Upon learning that Daly was Jewish, they beat him
severely. One of Daly's assailants, Michael Earl Dobbins, was charged
and convicted under Florida's hate crimes statute. 8
charged in the accusatory pleading:.
(a) The crime against the person of another either includes the present
ability to commit a violent injury or causes actual physical injury ....
n Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 450 (Ohio 1992).
12 Id.
1 Id. The remarks are quoted above. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
14 Id. Actually, Wyant involved several consolidated cases. The facts of only one case
are presented here, but the legal arguments employed by the Ohio Supreme Court are
common to all. ORIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992 & Supp. 1993) states
as follows:
(A) No person shall violate section 2903.21, 2903.22, 2909.06, or 2909.07,
or division (A)(3), (4), or (5) of the Revised Code by reason of the race, color,
religion, or national origin of another person or group of persons.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of ethnic intimidation. Ethnic
intimidation is an offense of the next higher degree than the offense the
commission of which is a necessary element of ethnic intimidation.
's Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 923 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
16 Id.
17 Id.
'8 Id.; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). The statute
provides:
(1) The penalty for any felony or misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided
in this subsection if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences
prejudice based on the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion or national origin
[Vol. 82
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No one, except perhaps the offenders, believes that hate crimes are
anything but odious and malevolent. 9 The victims are selected not for
what they may have done, but merely for who they are. Their immutable
characteristics become red flags and the victims receive a singular
message: you must always be on guard, wary, and afraid. The message
is a pernicious and malignant one, and one that ideally should be
contained.
The question then becomes how best to remedy the increasing
incidence of hate crimes in our society. To many, the panacea is a hate
crimes law, a statute that punishes an offender if, in the commission of
his crime,20 he was motivated by prejudice.2' Such hate crimes statutes
generally enhance penalties for existing crimes motivated by bias or
create new offenses comprised of existing crimes augmented by bias
To others, however, hate crimes legislation reaches a laudable goal only
by first riding roughshod over the First Amendment to the United States
of the victim.
'9 As a threshold matter, when used in this Article, "hate crime" refers to a crime
against a person or against property motivated by the offender's bias against persons of
the victim's race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, gender or sexual orientation. This
definition follows those of virtually all state and federal laws concerning hate crimes. See,
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085
(West 1992 & Supp. 1993); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992 & Supp.
1993); and the proposed federal statute, H.R. 1152 § 2(b). For a description of the
proposed federal statute, see infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
This Article employs the masculine pronoun in general references. This practice
should be viewed not as an assertion that women are not often either the victims or
perpetrators of hate crimes, but as an acquiescence to my traditional training in English.
See Irving Younger, The English Language Is Sex-Neutral, 72 A.B.A.J. 89 (1986).
21 Indeed, in Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), the United States Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the Wisconsin hate crimes statute. Id. at 2195, 2196.
' Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 333, 343-44 (1991). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1992
& Supp. 1993) (new offense); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.645 (West 1989-90) (penalty
enhancement).
For doctrinal purposes and the purposes of this Article, the two types of hate crime
statutes are indistinguishable. Certainly, there are distinctions between statutes that create
separate crimes and those that enhance penalties. However, for the purposes of this
Article's First Amendment focus, the statutes present no notable distinction; predicate
offenses are punished more rigorously because of an offender's motivation. For a listing
of which states have which types of hate crimes statutes, see THE ANTI-DEFAMArION
LEAGUE, HATE CRIMES STATUTES: A 1991 STATUS REPORT 22-23 (1991) [hereinafter
ADL STATUS REPORT].
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Constitution, which protects free speech and, presumably, free thought.'
Such an approach is anathema to many First Amendment purists.
This Article follows the latter conviction. Part I briefly outlines the
problem addressed by hate crimes statutes.' Part II describes the
legislative approach to hate crimes, including the influential Anti-
Defamation League ("ADL") model statute.' Part III addresses the
judicial response to state hate crimes legislation, including the U.S.
Supreme Court's determination in Wisconsin v. Mitchelf 6 and the earlier
state court treatments.27 Part IV provides a detailed analysis of hate
crimes legislation in light of the United States Supreme Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence and suggests that such statutes are inherently
offensive to the Constitution. 28 The analysis concludes with an alterna-
tive approach for strildng down state hate crimes statutes, an approach
that relies upon state constitutions and the New Judicial Federlism'
L THE PROBLEM
There is little dispute that the prevalence of hate crimes is a serious
problem in the United States, one that grows with each passing year."
In 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation made public for the first
time data collected pursuant to the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990."'
Only thirty-two states provided information to the FBI, but the total
"' See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Wis. 1992) ("Even more
fundamentally, the Constitution protects all speech and thought, regardless of how
offensive it might be."). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes aptly asserted that "[i]f there is
any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any
other it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought we hate." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55
(1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). None of the Mitchell arnici curiae dispute the assumption
that the First Amendment applies with equal vigor to thought. See, e.g., Brief of
Petitioner, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
2 See infra notes 30-52 and accompanying text.
25 See inra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
2 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194.
See infra notes 78-136 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 137-202 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text.
31 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio, Alabama, et al., in Support of Petitioner at 5-6,
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515) and sources cited therein.
31 See infra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae The
Anti-Defamation League, et al., in Support of Petitioner at 6, Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993) (No. 92-515).
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number of hate crimes reported was 4,558. Sixty per cent of those were
racially based?3
In addition to sheer number, hate crimes are also cause for concern
because they are of a different character than other crimes.
Research on bias-motivated crimes is in its infancy, but the available
evidence indicates that these crimes are generally much more violent and
have a significantly greater community impact than other crimes. One
researcher, for example, analyzed 452 hate crime cases inBoston during the
period between 1983 and 1987 (the "McDevitt Study"). The data revealed
that 74% of bias-motivated assault incidents (including assault and battery
and assault with a dangerous weapon) involved some physical injury to the
victim. The national figure for all assault cases was considerably less at
29%.M
Likewise, the effects of hate crimes are different and potentially more far-
reaching than the effects of other types of crimes.
There appears to have been only limited research on the topic of discrimina-
tion crime, but at least one study found that victims of violent discrimination
suffer greater emotional harm. Victims of ethnic violence suffered 21%
more symptoms of stress than victims of similar acts of non-ethnic
violence?
Finally, but of no lesser significance, is the harm that the commission of hate
crimes causes to the entire community. Hate crimes can "directly intimidate
the entire segment of the community with which the victim is identified,
making large sections of the population feel unprotected by the law." '3
Social scientists and legal reformers have not only attempted to document
the effects of hate crimes, they have also looked for the causes. 7 One
Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, et al., supra note 31, at 6.
"Id.
3Id. at 7 (citing JACK McDEvrrr, THE STUDY OF THE CHAtACTER OF CiIL RIGHTS
CpImms IN MASSACHUSETTS (1983-1987) (1989)).
" Brief of Petitioner, supra note 23, at 27 (citing Joan C. Weiss, et al., Ethno-
violence at Work, I oF INTErPGROUP RELATIONS 17-28 (1991-92)). Some of the symptoms
include sleep problems, concentration problems, alcohol abuse, aggressiveness, and
hopelessness. Id. (citing Weiss, supra, at 27). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Ohio,
Alabama, et al., supra note 30, at 6-8 (supporting the theory that victims of hate crimes
experience greater emotional trauma).
"' Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, et a., supra note 31, at 8.
37 JACK LEVIN & JACK McDEvlT, HATE CUMEs: THE RIsING TIDE OF BIGOTRY
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obvious cause is resentment." It is not so much resentment toward an
individual, or even at an entire group; rather, it is often resentment
toward society as a whole.39
It is the wider society from which a perpetrator is estranged, and it is
the wider society that he perceives as having rejected him. He is
convinced that the country has changed for the worse, that political
leaders are taking us down the road to total ruination, and that people
like himself-the "little guys"-have lost all control of their destiny 0
Thus, the hate crime perpetrator seeks to rebuild his tenuous self-esteem
by preying on someone whom he perceives as inferior.4 '
One specific type of resentment is economic. In the last decade,
increasing numbers of industrial jobs have been eliminated as the
American economy moves toward a more service-oriented economy.42
Many lower-middle-class workers have had to accept lower-paying, more
menial jobs.43 "The traditional American middle-class lifestyle is
slipping away, and somebody somewhere must be responsible. "
Specific local, national, or international events have also triggered
hate-inspired violence. For example, at the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf
War, Arab-Americans were the victims of hate crime on several
occasions." Moreover, in 1992, a jury in Simi Valley, California, chose
not to convict four white police officers who had been videotaped while
beating black motorist Rodney King.' To many, the beating was a race-
based crime.47 After the announcement of the verdict, several days of
rioting left more than fifty people dead and entire blocks of South Central
AND BLOODSHED 45-63 (1993) [hereinafter RISING TIDE].
3& Id.
39 Id. at 47-48.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 48 (citing THEODORE W. ADoRNo ET AL., THE ATrHORITARiAN PERSONAL-
TY (1950)).
47 RISING TIDE, supra note 37, at 49-50 (citing KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF
THE RicH AND THE POOR (1990) and KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FAILING FROM GRACE:
THE EXPERIENCE OF DOwNwARD MoBIrLy IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS (1988)).
43 RISING TIDE, supra note 37, at 50-51.
' Id. at 52.
" See Stephen Franklin, Arab-Americans Still Feeling War's Effects, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Aug. 5, 1991, at 4.
4 See Ken Foskett, Verdicts Returned in LA. Beating: Downtown Buildings Hit By




Los Angeles in ashes.48 In several instances, black rioters specifically
chose to bum Korean-American-owned shops because they believed that
the Korean merchants had a history of treating black people disrespectful-
ly.4! ' In addition, a group of young black men beat white truck driver
Reginald Denny nearly to death50
Changes in traditional social structures have also resulted in
increasing numbers of Americans feeling alienated from the society."
Often, those disenfranchised people choose to redeem their battered self-
esteem by blaming others and by hurting those whom they come to
believe have caused their discomfort, a phenomenon that is hardly unique
to the last quarter of the twentieth century.52
I. THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
A. .The Anti-Defamation League Model Statute
The Anti-Defamation League ("ADL") has played an important role
in the proliferation of ethnic violence or hate crimes laws.53 The ADL
was founded in 1913 and its mission, as set forth in its charter, has been
"to secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike and to put an end
forever to unjust and unfair discrimination against and ridicule of any sect
or body of citizens."' The ADL became involved in promoting the
legislative prohibition of hate crimes in 1981, after noting a sharp
increase in anti-Semitic violence.5 As a part of this promotion, the
ADL's legal affairs department drafted model legislation in 1981. The
model statute has four parts, including criminal proscriptions against both
See David Nyban, Paying the Price ofMalign Neglect, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17,
1992, at 87.
49 See Pat Morrison, After the Riots, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1992, at B3.
'o See LA Driver Recovering, Doctors Say, AT'ANTA J. & CONST., May 4, 1992,
at A8.
si RISING TIDE, supra note 37, at 49-51.
5 The history of Germany inthe years between 1919 and 1945 serves as an example
of a beleaguered society that found scapegoats. See generally MARTIN GILBERT, THE
HOLOcAUST: A HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF EUROPE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(1986) (discussing the anti-Semitic politics and policies of the Nazis during the war).
Sadly, the newly unified Germany is home to some tragically similar ethnic violence.
RISING TIDE, supra note 37, at 149-52.
' More than half of the state hate crimes laws now in force are in some way
derivative of the ADL model statute. ADL STATUS REPORT, supra note 22, at 22-23.
-4 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, et al., supra note 31, at 1




institutional vandalism and ethnic intimidation; a civil enforcement
mechanism for either of the former offenses; and a reporting provision.'
In drafting the intimidation provision, ADL lawyers specifically borrowed
language from various state and federal antidiscrimination laws, assuming
that because those laws had withstood constitutional attack, the intimida-
tion statute would as well.'
B. State Hate Crimes Statutes
The penalty enhancement statute that doubled Todd Mitchell's
sentence is not unique to Wisconsin." The legislatures of twenty-six
states and the District of Columbia have enacted similar statutes.59
Legislatures in twenty additional states have criminalized hate crimes in
other ways, and Congress is poised to follow." There is, perhaps, no
more clear evidence of the popularity of hate crimes legislation than the
submissions to the United States Supreme Court when the Court granted
ceriorari in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.61 Of twenty-six amicus curiae briefs
filed, sixteen supported the State of Wisconsin and its statute.' With the
See ADL STATUS REPORT, supra note 22, at 4.
5 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, et al., supra note 31, at 14
n.12; see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (upholding
antidiscrimination laws). The intimidation provision of the ADL Model Legislation is as
follows:
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual
or perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another
individual or group of individuals, he violates Section _ of the Penal Code
(insert code provision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief, harassment,
menacing, assault and/or other appropriate statutorily proscribed criminal
conduct).
B. Intimidation is a misdemeanor/felony (the degree of the criminal
liability should be at least one degree more serious than that imposed for
commission of the offense).
See ADL STATUS REPORT, supra note 22, at 4. Compare the above language to that in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000(h)(6) (1988).
S See ADL STATUS REPORT, supra note 22, at 22-23 (providing a list of other states
which use penalty enhancement statutes).
s' See Coyle, supra note 2, at 1 (referring to the amicus curiae brief of the Anti-
Defamation League in Wisconsin v. Mitchell).
' Id.; see also Recent Case: First Amendment-Bias-Motivated Crimes, 106 HAIv.
L. REV. 957, 957 n.1 (1993) (discussing the likelihood of the passage of hate crimes
legislation by Congress).
6 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992) (granting certiorari).
6 Id.
[Vol. 82
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Supreme Court's ruling in favor of the State of Wisconsin, more states are
likely to join in the frenzy of penalty enhancement statutes.63
C. Federal Hate Crimes Statutes
The federal government has also become involved in the hate crimes
issue. In 1990, Congress enacted, and President George Bush signed, the
Hate Crimes Statistics Act." The Act is devoid of any substantive
proscription on behavior; rather, it requires that the Attorney General
gather data on hate crimes for the calendar year 1990 and the succeeding
four calendar years.65 As such, the Hate Crimes Statistics Act might well
be seen as a precursor to an actual criminal prohibition, assuming that the
first step toward passing a criminal law is to document a problem.'
' In an oddly related incident, the president of the California State Bar called for
consideration of state legislation to enhance penalties for crimes committed against
attorneys, much as penalties are stiffer for crimes against police, judges, and certain
political figures. HARRISBURG PATRIOT-NEWS, July 8, 1993, at B6, col. 1; see also 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1993) (criminal statute dealing with
murder of police officers). The bar president's remarks came in the wake of a shooting
spree at the offices of a San Francisco law finn, Pettit & Martin, in which eight people
were killed. See HARRISBURG PATRiOT-NEWs, supra.
28 U.S.C. § 534 (1990).
Id. at § 534(a)(1).
It is interesting to note that, in a political compromise, section 2 of the Act
provides:
(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed, nor shall any funds appropriated to carry
out the purpose of the Act be used, to promote or encourage homosexuality.
28 U.S.C. § 534(2)(b). The long route the Act took through Congress is ably documented
in Joseph M. Femandez, Bringing Hate Crimes Into Focus-The Hate Crime Statistics Act
of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-275, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261 (1991). Fernandez
describes how North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms called the bill "this statistical
nonsense" and worried that the bill gave "undue protection and respectability to gays and
lesbians." Id. at 276-281 & n.102. In an effort to dull the impact he feared, Helms offered
a "Sense of the Senate" amendment:
It is the sense of the Senate that-
(1) the homosexual movement threatens the strength and the survival of the
American family as the basic unit of society;
(2) State sodomy laws should be enforced because they are in the best
interest of public health;
(3) the Federal government should not provide discrimination protection on
the basis of sexual orientation; and
(4) school curriculums should not condone homosexuality as an acceptable
lifestyle in American society.
Id. at 278 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. 81169 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1990)). There was enough
sense in the Senate for that body to reject Helms' Sense of the Senate amendment and
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
At this writing, Congress is considering a substantive measure that
closely resembles the ADL statute and the statutes of several states. The
Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993 ("HCSEA")' is a
penalty-enhancement statute applicable where the underlying crime was
"motivated by hatred, bias, or prejudice, based on the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orienta-
tion of another individual or group of individuals."6
Sentencing in the federal courts is governed by a complex set of rules
known as the Sentencing Commission Guidelines ("Guidelines")."9 Each
federal crime is accorded a base level offense." Various factors may
increase or decrease that initial number, including a finding that the crime
involved more than minimal planning7e ' or that the defendant has
accepted responsibility for his crime.72 After a judge calculates all of the
possible variables, he arrives at a final number. The judge then refers to
a table in the Guidelines, cross-references the offense level with the
defendant's criminal history category, and finds the assigned sentence
range.
73
approve the Hate Crimes Statistics Act by a vote of 92-4. 136 CoNG. REC. S1092 (daily
ed. Feb. 8, 1990). The Senate did, however, pass the "promote or encourage homosexuali-
ty" language, offered as an amendment by Illinois Democratic Senator Paul Simon and
Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch to appease Helms and those in sympathy with him.
136 CONG. REc. S1067, S1083 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1990). Given the reaction of Senator
Helms and his supporters, the prospects for unadulterated passage of the Hate Crimes
Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993, see infra note 67, seem dubious as the bill includes
among the proscribed motives "sexual orientation." On September 21, 1993, the House
of Representatives passed the HCSEA and sent it to the Senate for consideration. See
ADL Hails House Passage of Federal Hate Crime Measure, U.S. NEWSWIRE Sept. 21,
1993. As this Article goes to press, the measure is under consideration by the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 1152, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REc. H911 (1993).
6 Id. at § 2(b).
69 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1984), provides for the
United States Sentencing Commission to develop guidelines for federal courts to follow
in sentencing. The first set of guidelines was completed and presented to Congress on
April 13, 1987, and took effect November 1, 1987. The Guidelines have been amended
three times at this writing. U.S.S.G. at 1-10 (1992).
70 For example, under the Guidelines, aggravated assault is assigned a base level
offense of fifteen. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(a).
1 See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(1). A judge applying an enhancement for more than
minimal planning would ordinarily add two points to the offense level.
72 See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(a). A judge allowing an adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility would ordinarily subtract two points from the offense level, although the
exact number may vary.
7 See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table (1992).
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The HCSEA requires that, where a crime is motivated by hatred, bias,
or prejudice, as defined in the statute, the base offense level be increased
by no fewer than three levels.' In concrete terms, such an enhancement
can be substantial. For example, assume a jury finds Defendant guilty of
the aggravated assault of Victim. The federal probation office prepares a
pre-sentencing investigation report and informs Judge that Defendant has
little or no criminal history and that no adjustments apply. Judge should
then apply a final offense level of fifteen, which would allow him to
impose a sentence of between eighteen and twenty-four months.75
Assume that the jury additionally finds that Defendant assaulted Victim
because Victim is of a different race. Now, the final offense level is
eighteen, and Judge must sentence Defendant to between twenty-seven
and thirty-three months.'
Although the legislative history of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act
suggests that some of the HCSA's provisions will most likely create
controversy," the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitchell has
given impetus to efforts to enact the federal legislation.
11 THE JUDICIAL APPROACH
A. The United States Supreme Court
Although the issue of the constitutionality of hate crimes statutes had
generated a major schism in the liberal community," it unified an often
contentious Supreme Court.79 In a unanimous and brief opinion, the
Mitchell Court dispatched the arguments proffered against the statute."0
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion and began his
analysis with Todd Mitchell's contention that the Court was bound by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute as punishing
"bigoted thought and not conduct."'" The Chief Justice agreed that the
74 H.RL 1152, supra note 67, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. 8792 (1993).
"' See supra note 70 and U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table (1992).
76 U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.
' See supra note 66. If the mere gathering of statistics concerning assaults on
homosexuals angered some conservatives, an actual criminal proscription of assaults on
homosexuals is sure to engender emotional debate.
n See infra notes 123-29.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
"Id. The opinion fills only nine pages in the West Publishing Company's Supreme
Court Reporter.
Si Id. at 2198.
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Court must defer to a state court's construction of a state statute," but
concluded that the Wisconsin court had not merely interpreted a word or
a phrase but characterized the "practical effect" of the statute. 3 As such,
the interpretation was not binding on the Court.'
The Court next addressed the central issue: whether the First
Amendment proscribes penalty enhancement statutes. The Court
recognized that the State of Wisconsin was on poor footing in asserting
that the penalty-enhancing statute punished only conduct. 5
... [rlhe fact remains that under the Wisconsin statute the same
criminal conduct may be more heavily punished if the victim is selected
because of his race or other protected status than if no such motive
obtained. Thus, although the statute punishes criminal conduct, it
enhances the maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discrimina-
tory point of view more severely than the same conduct engaged in for
some other reason or no reason at all. Because the only reason for the
enhancement is the defendant's discriminatory motive for selecting his
victim, Mitchell argues (and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held) that
the statute violates the First Amendment by punishing offenders' bigoted
belief."
Chief Justice Rehnquist then described several cases in which the Court
had hinted that a sentencing judge could consider an offender's racial
animus.
Rehnquist invoked the Court's 1992 opinion in Dawson v. Dela-
ware" and its 1983 opinion in Barclay v. Florida to support his
proposition that a defendant's abstract beliefs, even though offensive to
the community, may not be considered during sentencing. In Barclay, the
' See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
s3 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2198.
'* Id. at 2199.
Id.; see also Brief of Petitioner, supra note 23, at 36 (trying to distinguish a
general belief from the hateful 'motive" that led to selecting the victim).
86 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2199.
s7 One of the first cases that the Chief Justice cited was Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987), in which the Court held that "[d]eeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the
idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and,
therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished." Id. at 156. Rehuquist's reference to
Tison and its "purposeful" language suggests that the Court failed to appreciate the
distinction between intent and motive. See infra notes 169-73.
ss 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
,' 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
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Court held that a judge had properly taken note of the offender's
membership in the Black Liberation Army in sentencing the man for the
apparently race-based murder of a white man." In Dawson, the Court
considered the introduction, at sentencing, of the defendant's membership
in the "Aryan Brotherhood," a racist prison group. The Court, per Chief
Justice Rehnquist, concluded that the defendant's abstract beliefs were not
proper considerations at sentencing because there was no demonstrated
connection between the defendant's crime-a murder-and his racist
beliefs.9' In dictum, however, the Chief Justice wrote that "the Constitu-
tion does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence
concerning one's beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because
those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment."'
The Mitchell Court next pointed out that the Wisconsin hate crimes
statute, like most, used almost the same language as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.'3 Noting that it had upheld both federal and state
discrimination laws,94 the Court determined that there was no meaning-
ful distinction between those laws and hate crimes laws.9'
Many opponents of hate crimes laws had argued that the fate of those
statutes was effectively doomed by the Court's holding in R.A. V v. St.
Paul.96 In R.A. V, the Court rejected a municipal ordinance prohibiting
the use of 'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'onthe basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender."' 97 The fatal flaw in the R-4. V.
statute was that it singled out certain speech or expressive conduct as
offensive. The Court found such a content-based regulation offensive to
90 Barclay, 463 U.S. at 949-50. Supporters of hate crimes statutes have pointed out
that the Court in Barclay held that "[t]he United States Constitution does not prohibit a
trial judge from taking into account the elements of racial hatred in this murder" when
sentencing. Id. at 949. Barday, however, is not proper precedent for the First Amendment
considerations of Mitchell, as the Supreme Court's holding in Barclay was predicated on
other grounds. Id. at 940 (holding that the trial court had wrongly considered aggravating
circumstances not included in the statute, but characterizing the error as harmless).
91 Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1097-98.
9 Id. at 1097. It is important to note that the quoted passage, when read in the
context of the entire decision, is little more than ictum.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2008(h)(6) (1989). Title VII proscribes employment discrimi-
nation "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
' See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984), and Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
9s Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2200 (1993).
9 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
97 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (quoting RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2547 (citing St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990))).
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the First Amendment.98 By distinction, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued
in Mitchell that the conduct proscribed by the Wisconsin hate crimes
legislation is not expressive and therefore not protected. 9
For his penultimate rationale in Mitchell, the Chief Justice pointed to
the particularly harmful effects of hate crimes,"' justifying the Wiscon-
sin statute as being aimed primarily at preventing these harms rather than
stifling disagreeable beliefs or biases."
Finally, the Court addressed Mitchell's claim that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad and would therefore engender a "chilling
effect" on free speech." The Court almost summarily dismissed this
contention as "too speculative a hypothesis." ' 3  Further, the Court
identified precedent that permitted the "evidentiary use of speech to
establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.""34 Thus,
with a short, unified declaration, the Supreme Court reversed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's rejection of the hate crimes law.'
B. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
The Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion that was reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court had itself reversed a decision of the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals upholding Mitchell's conviction."6 The lower state court had
determined that the statute punished conduct rather than words or beliefs
and that the statute was neither vague nor overbroad."7 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Speaking through Chief Justice
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
10 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
101 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. Rehnquist quoted Blackstone, who wrote that "it is
but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should be most severely
punished, which are the most destructive of the public safety and happiness." 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIBS 16.
o Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201; see also Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 31-37.
'03 Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2201.
104 Id.
105 To Supreme Court observers, the unanimity and decisiveness of the opinion was
not a surprise. Indeed, at oral arguments on April 21, 1993, Justices Anthony Kennedy,
Antonin Scalia, Byron White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist evinced at least some sympathy
for the statute. See 61 U.S.L.W. 3725, 3725-27 (April 27, 1993).
" See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 485 N.W.2d
807 (Wis. 1992).
'07 473 N.W.2d at 1.
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Nathan Stewart Heffernan, a split court found both that the statute
violated the First Amendment and that it was overbroad." 8
Thus, the hate crimes statute is facially invalid because it directly
punishes a defendant's constitutionally protected thought. The hate
crimes statute is also unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is
overbroad when it intrudes upon a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected activity. Aside from punishing thought, the hate crimes statute
also threatens to directly punish an individual's speech and assuredly
will have a chilling effect upon free speech."
Two justices dissented. Justice William Bablitch argued that hate
crimes laws are indistinguishable from employment discrimination and
civil rights laws.1 ' He argued that the statute does not, in fact, punish
thought; rather, what it "does punish is acting upon those thoughts."..
In her dissent, Justice Shirley Abrahamson began by noting that, had she
been in the legislature, she would likely not have voted for the hate
crimes law "because I do not think [it] will accomplish its goal.""'
Admitting to "much vacillation," Justice Abrahamson concluded, like
Justice Bablitch, that the statute in reality regulated conduct and not
speech.
13
C. Other State Cases
While other state courts have split on the constitutionality of hate
crimes statutes, with more siding in favor of the statutes,"' there are
recurring themes in the decisions. In State v. Wyant,"5 for example, the
Ohio Supreme Court struck down Ohio's hate crimes statute. The court,
1o 485 N.W.2d at 807.
109 Id. at 815.
"o Id. at 819 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
. Id. at 820.
112 Id. at 818 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
... Id. at 818-19.
114 See People v. Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 1993) (upholding
California statute); Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding
Florida statute); People v. Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815 (City Crim. Ct. 1988) (upholding
New York statute); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992) (upholding Oregon
statute); State v. Hendrix, 813 P.2d 1115 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding Oregon statute).
But see Mitchell (rejecting Wisconsin statute) and State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio
1992) (rejecting Ohio statute).
.. 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992).
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in an opinion by Justice Herbert Brown, concluded that the statute
impermissibly targeted the perpetrator's thoughts and was thus inimical
to the First Amendment."6 The Oregon Supreme Court, in contrast,
upheld Oregon's bias crimes statute in State v. Plowman."7 The court
found that the Oregon statute was not vague and that rather than
proscribing expression, the statute proscribed an impermissible effect."'
The California Court of Appeals also had occasion to consider its
state's hate crimes law. In People v. Joshua H., 9 the court disagreed
with the Ohio and Wisconsin Supreme Courts, and concluded that the
California hate crimes law targeted an act, not the underlying bigotry.'
Finally, the Florida District Court of Appeals ruled on Florida's hate
crimes law, holding that the law did not punish the defendant's opinion
but, rather, the act that flowed from it.' The three-judge panel con-
cluded, among other things, that the statute was indistinguishable from
employment discrimination prohibitions that have been repeatedly
upheld.' 2
D. Liberal Confusion
The debate about ethnic intimidation laws is a difficult one for
liberals," who find themselves between Scylla and Charybdis."
Traditionally, liberals have been thought to be the strongest proponents
of free speech and free expression."z Likewise, they have urged societal
116 Id. at 457.
17 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992).
I d. at 565-66.
1W 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (1993).
u2 Id. at 299-301.
121 Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
122 Id. at 925.
1 In using the term "liberal," I mean those individuals and groups traditionally
associated with liberal ideas, realizing full well that such a label ignores important
nuances.
124 In Homer's ODYSSEY, the hero, Odysseus, travels home from war. He and his crew
face many obstacles. As they travel through the Strait of Messina, they are confronted on
one side by the monster, Scylla, and on the other by the whirlpool, Charybdis. Steering
too close to either will bring disaster. Id.
" For example, well-known liberal attorney William M. Kunstler argued against the
Texas flag desecration statute at issue in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see also
Brief of Amicus Curiae, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio in Support of
Respondent at 1, Mitchell (No. 92-515) (arguing in opposition to hate crimes statutes out
of concern for free speech and expression).
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tolerance and struggled to abolish hate."' When the two goals clash,
liberal groups find themselves in a quandary, not knowing whether to
steer toward the Scylla of hatred or the Charybdis of First Amendment
restriction.
Two noteworthy examples of this dilemma are evident in the amicus
curiae briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. In
a move that surprised many, 7 the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") sided with the State of Wisconsin, filing a brief that argued
that the real issue is not whether to allow discrimination or stifle free
expression but, rather, whether there is any expression at all in hate
crimes or simply harmful conduct." One chapter that dissented from
the national organization's position, however, was the Ohio ACLU."z
The Ohio chapter's board of directors voted to part with the national
ACLU, concluding that the latter had "accorded insufficient weight to
First Amendment values." '
The ACLU's commitment to free speech has always stood side-by-side
with a commitment to equal protection of the laws. Thus, throughout
their history, the Ohio and National ACLUs consistently have argued in
this and other courts in favor of antidiscrimination laws. However, there
are times when the reconciliation of conflicting values of freedom of
expression and equal protection is very difficult-and individuals and
organizations may, in good faith, differ on that resolution.1
3'
Similarly, constitutional law scholars who normally stand on the same
side of the lectern find themselves in disagreement about hate crimes
laws. In their brief to the Court in Mitchell, a group of seven constitution-
al law professors and writers, including Alan Dershowitz and Gerald
Gunther, argued vehemently against the hate crimes statute, con-
" Brief of Amicus Curiae, the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of
Petitioner at 1, Mitchell (No. 92-515).
127 See Cauchon, Civil Dispute Within the ACLU: Debate Over Competing Principles,
USA TODAY, March 31, 1993, at 1A.
'2, Brief of Amicus Curiae, the American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 126, at
4.
1" Brief of Amicus Curiae, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, supra note
125, at 1.13 0 Id.
131 Id.
132 Brief of Amicus Curiae, Lany Alexander, Ralph Brown, Alan Dershowitz, David
Goldberger, Gerald Gunther, Nat Hentoff and Diane Zimmerman in Support of
Respondent, Mitchell (No. 92-515).
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cluding that "[a]s dangerous and offensive as any expression of racism or
bigotry may be, considerably more dangerous is any attempt by the
government to control the minds of its citizens." ' Conversely, Harvard
Law Professor Laurence Tribe told the congressional subcommittee
considering the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement ActM that
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that prevents government from
enhancing the sentences on crimes against people or property based on
race, religion or other factors."'3
This split among those who are ordinarily allies underscores the
difficulty of the issue. It also illuminates the difficulty that opponents of
hate crimes statutes face when the measures are before state or federal
legislatures: whatever political power liberal groups might hold is spht,
with the majority apparently supporting the statutes.'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Conduct Plus: The O'BrienP'Analysis
A number of state courts, in upholding hate crimes legislation, have
suggested that the First Amendment offers freedom to hold an opinion,
but not to act on it.38 Indeed, Judge Charles Harris of the Florida
District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District borrowed (perhaps
unwittingly) from John Stuart Mill's On Liberty to "bolster" his court's
holding.
Such being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings
should be free to form opinions, and to express their opinions without
reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual, and
through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is either
conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine
whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act
upon their opinions-to carry these out in their lives, without hinderance,
133 Id. at 13.
134 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
135 States News Service, Congress Considers Hate Crime Punishment, July 29, 1992.
136 See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
13 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
13 See, e.g., Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992); People v.
Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 1993).
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either physical or moral, from their fellow men, so long as it is at their own
risk and peril.'
Mill's eloquence, however, does not offer succor to proponents of hate crimes
statutes; rather, it illustrates a distinction already present in most of the crimi-
nal law between opinion and conduct. Hate crimes laws unnecessarily blur the
distinction.
The proper starting place for an analysis of hate crimes laws is United
States v. OBrien.14° In 1966, David Paul OBrien burned his draft card on
the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. Several FBI agents in the audience
arrested him and charged him with violating the Universal Military Training
and Service Act of 1948,141 which levelled punishment at anyone who
"forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner
changes any such certificate.""14 OBrien was convicted in the United States
District Court, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed the conviction upon finding the Act to be an unconstitutional en-
croachment on the First Amendment. 43
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the First
Circuit." The Court, per Chief Justice Earl Warren, first indicated that a
different analysis would apply in cases in which a person claims First
Amendment protection for conduct, rather than speech. Warren then described
a dichotomy between "content-neutral" laws and "content-based" laws.145
A content-neutral law criminalizes an act because the conduct itself is ini-
mical to society's interests, without reference to the expressive component of
the conduct.1' A content-based law, on the other hand, proscribes conduct
139 Dobbins, 605 So. 2d at 924 (quoting JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859)).
Benjamin Franklin offered a similar thought more than 125 years before Mill (when
Franklin was but sixteen years old).
Without freedom of thought there can be no such thing as wisdom, and no such
thing as public liberty without freedom of speech; which is the right of every
man as far as by it he does not hurt and control the right of another and this
is the only check it ought to suffer, and the only bounds it ought to know.
Randy Lewis, A Few Words About Censorship vs. the Freedom of Speech, LA. TIMES,
June 17, 1990, at 46D.
140 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
141 50 U.S.C. § 462 (1965) (the 1965 statute was in effect when O'Brien destroyed his
draft card).
142 Id.
143 United States v. O'Brien, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'A 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
,41 Id. at 377. Warren did not actually use the terms "content-neutral' and "content-
based"; they were coined by later commentators discussing O'Brien. See David R Fine,
Comment, Symbolic Expression and the Rehnquist Court, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 777, 783
n.30 (1991) (describing development of terminology).
'4 391 U.S. at 377.
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specifically because of the message.'47 The Court concluded that content-
based statutes should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard, while
content-neutral laws would receive a deferential balancing of interests, or
means-ends, review."' Chief Justice Warren set forth a four-part test to
determine if a statute proscribing conduct could survive a First Amendment
challenge, asking (1) if the statute is within the constitutional power of the
state, (2) if it relates to an important or substantial government interest, (3) if
the statute does not seek to suppress free expression, and (4) if any incidental
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater than required to
meet the important governmental interest.14 9 The content-neutral/content-
based dichotomy essentially focuses on the third inquiry.
Many of those who support hate crimes statutes argue that they are
content-neutral statutes. 5 In a 1993 note in the Columbia Law Review,"
the author suggests:
A typical penalty-enhancement statute punishes crimes committed "against
a person or a person's property because of such person's race [etc.]." On its
face, such a statute addresses the defendant's motive for committing the
crime. The Wisconsin statute concerns crimes in which the perpetrator
"intentionally selects the [victim] because of the race ... of that person."
That statute addresses the mason for selecting the individual. Neither of
these types ofpenalty-enhancement statutes on its face prohibits conduct on
the basis of its expressive content."2
This ignores a reality of penalty-enhancement statutes.' Universally, they




"' See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, et al., supra note
31, at 26.
... Eric J. Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitution-
ality of Penalty Enhancement for Bias Crmes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 178 (1993).
"2 Id. at 214.
"3 In his brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, Mitchell compared the facts of O'Brien
with those of his case.
David O'Brien could not have received additional penalties for having violated
the statute "because of" his opposition to the Vietnam War. For this reason,
Wisconsin's attempt to analogize its hate crime enhancement law to the draft
card destruction law in O'Brien is flawed. The proper analogy would compare
hate crime enhancement to a law which punished draft card destruction but
increased the penalties when the burning was motivated by opposition to
government policies.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 4, at 14-15 (citations and footnote omitted).
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protect certain people when they are targeted because of a distinguishing
characteristic. The former, aiming only to protect particular citizens
regardless of what motivates the perpetrator, would be content-neutral.
The federal law punishing presidential assassins is an example of an
existing content-neutral law."5 The President is deemed so important
a citizen that an assassin, regardless of motive, will be punished more
severely than another murderer. Theoretically, a person could be
prosecuted for robbing and killing the President on a Washington street
comer even if the mugger did not know the victim to be the President.
Thus, the statute is content-neutral, the motive-be it greed, desperation,
or dementia-is unimportant.
The same can not be said of hate crimes statutes. Their raison d'etre
is to select out for greater punishment certain impermissible motives.
Thus, a white man robbing and killing a black man merely because the
victim was the only person on the street when the perpetrator chose to act
would not be subject to penalty enhancement. If, however, he chose the
black victim from a crowd because of the man's race, he would receive
a greater punishment. The statutes, unlike the presidential assassination
law, do not aim to protect certain people; they aim to protect all people
from crimes based on certain thoughts and motives. In this way, they are
content-based and should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis.55
When viewed under strict scrutiny, hate crimes laws cannot survive,"6
for hate crimes laws inherently fail to meet the O'Brien requirement that
they be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.'57
B. Categorization
It is important to note that not all speech or expression has been
afforded First Amendment protection. The U.S. Supreme Court has
carved out exceptions for certain types of speech that do not fall under
the ambit of the First Amendment.' These include "fighting words,"'59
1.4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1751 (1988); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1982 &
Supp. 1993) (sentencing procedure for first degree murder that enhances the penalty at
sentencing if victim was a fireman, peace officer, or public servant working in detention,
who was killed in the line of duty).
. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
..6 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning statute could not
survive strict scrutiny analysis).
.. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
" See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
'5' Id. at 572 (holding that "fighting words" are not protected).
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obscenity,'60 speech inciting imminent lawlessness, 61 speech inciting
imminent and violent overthrow of the government,'62 and libelous
speech.' There are those who argue that a new category should be
created for hate speech.'" For example, Professor Mari Matsuda
suggests a tripartite test for determining when speech should not be
protected by the First Amendment, advocating an exemption when "(1)
the message is of racial inferiority, (2) the message is directed against a
historically oppressed group, [and] (3) the message is persecutorial,
hateful, and degrading."'65
Although it is largely outside the scope of this Article, Professor
Matsuda's suggestion begs some response. First, it would undoubtedly be
difficult, in many instances, to discern when a message is one of racial
inferiority; words are subject to different interpretations depending upon
the context in which they are uttered. Second, limiting the exception to
messages directed at historically oppressed groups would be under-
inclusive in that it assumes that a hateful message is more damaging to
some people than others. 6 Third, messages that are persecutorial in
some situations are not so in others; context can be crucial." Finally,
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not
protected). While there has always been a majority of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court
who assume obscenity to be unprotected, the assumption is not unanimous. See infra note
241 (describing Justice Hugo Black's belief in an absolute application of the First
Amendment).
m" Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (holding that speech inciting
imminent lawless action is not protected).
16, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-11 (1951) (holding that speech inciting
imminent, violent overthrow of the government is not protected).
3 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268 (1964).
See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound- A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); Mar J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the ictim's Story, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2320
(1989). Professor Matsuda argues alternatively that hate speech should be considered
"fighting words" so that it falls within the Chaplinsky exception. Id. at 2357.
165 Matsuda, supra note 164, at 2357.
16 Matsuda answers this concern by noting that the harm inflicted upon a member of
the "dominant group" by a racist message is of a "different degree." Id. at 2362. She
notes that "[s]hould history change course, placing former victim groups in a dominant
or equalized position, the newly equalized group will lose the special protection suggested
here for expression of nationalist anger." Id. In essence, then, Professor Matsuda
advocates a society that must constantly reassess the dominance of its subgroups and
adjust its laws accordingly. Her statement suggests that hate is chameleon-like, virulent
and censorable when uttered by one person and nationalistic and acceptable when uttered
by another.
17 Some things or comments are simply out of place, like "a pig in the parlor instead
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of course, is the overarching criticism that there is nothing in hate speech that
suggests that it should be excepted from First Amendment protection
(assuming, for the moment, that any speech should be unprotected).'"
Many words have strong effects on their recipients. That is part of the
richness of the "marketplace of ideas." Censoring hate speech does not
extinguish the hate itselt it merely drives it underground; as firefighters
know, a smoldering fire is often the most destructive and difficult to combat.
C. The Motive/Intent Distinction
Proponents of hate crimes laws argue that the focus on motive inherent
in hate crimes statutes is indistinguishable from the criminal law concern with
intent. Because intent is an element ofinnumerable offenses, supporters assert
that hate crimes laws are no more offensive to the First Amendment than
most other criminal laws. 9
This assertion, however, ignores a noteworthy distinction. Intent refers to
state of mind or, more precisely, to the magnitude of the actor's desire to
bring about a consequence and his knowledge that a particular consequence
is likely. 70 Motive, by distinction, is the purpose that compels an actor.'
of the barnyard." Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); see also Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 696 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Vulgar language, like vulgar animals, may be acceptable in some contexts and
intolerable in others.").
" Although I am reluctant to refer to the fabled "slippery slope" (which after so
much use has assuredly, by erosion, become the "slippery cliff'), the acceptance of
exclusions to First Amendment protection surely invites proliferation of the sort advocated
by Professors Matsuda and Delgado. Matsuda recognizes such a possibility:
In speaking on this topic, I've found the most serious objection raised by
lawyers in the audiences is that of the slippery slope-that we must never censor
because censorship, once allowed, is beyond control. In answer, I acknowledge
that this is the central civil liberties concern, and argue that it is as well met by
narrowly defining racist speech as it is by other first amendment exceptions.
Matsuda, supra note 164, at 2352 n.164. Hence, Matsuda argues that creating new
exceptions to First Amendment protection is acceptable so long as it is accomplished by
small incursions. The fallacy in this is the tacit assumption that there can be small
incursions.
" See, e.g., People v. Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 295-96 (Ct. App. 1993); see
supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
170 See BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 727 (5th ed. 1979) ("The word 'intent' is used
throughout the Restatement of Torts, 2nd, to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain
to result from it.").
"7 Id. at 914 (defining 'motive" as the "[c]ause or reason that moves the will and
induces actions," and as "[a]n inducement, or that which leads, or tempts the mind to
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Consider a man who kills his wife in the course of an argument. The
law reasonably asks whether his act was premeditated and whether, in
striking her, he intended to bring about her death. These inquiries define
the crime and delineate between manslaughter and murder and, if the
crime was murder, between degrees. His motive might be his having
learned that she was unfaithful to him, her having learned that he was
unfaithful to her, or his finding supper distasteful. The law does not
inquire into motive qua motive. Questions regarding his motive might be
asked in order to elicit information about his intent (e.g., "When you
decided the rice was overcooked, did you go out and buy a baseball bat?"
is probative on the issue of premeditation), but motive standing by itself
is irrelevant.
In the same sense, at Todd Mitchell's trial for inciting an assault, it
was reasonable to ascertain whether he intended an assault to occur.172
Mitchell's motive--to harm a white person-is irrelevant outside the
context of the hate crimes statute.173
D. The Employment Discrimination Statutes
1. The Dilemma
Supporters of hate crimes legislation point to antidiscrimination laws,
noting that they have repeatedly been upheld"7 and claiming that they
are constitutionally indistinguishable from hate crimes statutes.'75
At first blush, such a comparison to antidiscrimination statutes is
compelling.
How can the Constitution not protect discrimination in the selection of
a victim for discriminatory hiring, firing or promotional practices, and
at the same time protect discrimination in the selection of a victim for
criminal activity?
76
indulge a criminal act.").
"3 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
m For a more exhaustive discussion of this issue, see Gellman, supra note 22, at 363-
68.
174 Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984); see also infra notes 176-79 and
accompanying text.
"7 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, The United States, in Support of Petitioner at
16-23, Mitchell (No. 92-515) and Brief of Amicus Curiae, The American Civil Liberties
Union, supra note 126, at 9-11.
176 Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 820 (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 82
HATE CRiMES
Many of the state hate crimes statutes, including Wisconsin's, are
patterned after the ADL model law.1" ADL lawyers, as previously
noted,17 used the same language in the ADL statute as Congress used
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."79 The model act provides:
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the
actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual
orientation of another individual or group of individuals, he violates
Section - of the Penal Code."'
Title VII, similarly, declares:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.18'
The language emphasized is clearly, and by design, similar." Oppo-
nents of hate crimes statutes are thus left with three options: (1) admit
that there is no meaningful distinction, (2) find some meaningful
distinction or (3) declare that antidiscrimination statutes are also
unconstitutional.
2. Gellman's Resolution
In her influential article, Sicks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, But
Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas
17 Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, et al., supra note 31, at 14
n.12.
1- Supra note 57 and accompanying text.
'7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1)-(17) (1989); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation
League, et al., supra note 31, at 14 n.12.
"o See ADL STATUS REPORT, supra note 22, at 4 (emphasis added).
is' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1989) (emphasis added); see Hate Is Not Speech: A
Constitutional Defense of Penalty Enhancement For Hate Crimes, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1314 (1993).
' See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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of Ethnic Intimidation Laws,' Susan Gellman, an adjunct professor at
Capital University Law School, offered a potential distinction between
antidiscrimination laws and hate crimes laws. Gellman wrote that the
intent of Congress in enacting Title VII can best be divined by reference
to the two principal theories that have arisen in litigation under the
statute, disparate treatment and disparate impact.84 A disparate treat-
ment case involves a plaintiff's claim that he was the subject of intention-
al discrimination based on one of the enumerated characteristics.185 In
a typical disparate treatment in hiring case, the plaintiff must first raise
an inference of discriminatory motive by making out a prima facie case
that he was qualified for a job, that he was rejected for the job, and that
the employer hired someone else not sharing the applicant's characteris-
tic. '8 A disparate impact case, however, is concerned not with the
motive but with the result. The central question in such a case is whether
some employment practice has caused a disparate impact on a protected
group.8 7 In developing such an analysis, the Supreme Court determined
that "Congress created the Act to address 'the consequences of employ-
ment practices,' not their motivation."'8  So noting, Gellman argued that
Title VH is distinguishable from hate crimes laws in that there is no
requirement that an improper motive be proven, only an improper
effect. ' 9 Thus, she concludes:
Bias-motivated discrimination and non-bias-motivated discrimination are
prohibited and penalized by the statute in exactly the same way, because
it is the distinct act of discrimination in employment, irrespective of
motive, that is proscribed, and not bigoted thining. The ADL model
statute does just the opposite: where the Civil Rights Act penalizes
discrimination equally whether or not motivated by racial animus, the
ethnic intimidation statute penalizes the prohibited conduct more
severely when it is so motivated. 9 '
'8 Gellman, supra note 22, at 368. The article often provided fodder for state courts
that struck down hate crimes legislation. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 809
n.5 (Wis. 1992); State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ohio 1992).
18 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).
1.. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973).
186 Id. at 802.
17 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
188 Gellman, supra note 22, at 368 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
189 Gellman, supra note 22, at 368.
'0 Id. at n.165.
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Critics of Gellman's reasoning, and they are legion, declare that hers
is a false distinction.
... [T]he prohibition against factoring race into employment decisions
is hardly a mere incidental result of anti-discrimination laws. Rather, the
Supreme Court has written that .'[d]isparate treatment' ... is the most
easily understood type of discrimination and [u]ndoubtedly ... was the
most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII." By
contrast, some have argued that prohibiting disparate impact was not
intended by the statute. It is ironic, then, that critics of the constitution-
ality of penalty-enhancement statutes would pin their distinction
between such statutes and anti-discrimination on the existence of
disparate impact. The argument implies that if in fact anti-discrimination
laws were limited to disparate treatment, they would then be unconstitu-
tional. It would also imply the unlikely result that if penalty-enhance-
ment statutes were broadened to permit a showing of disparate impact,
and thus conformed to anti-discrimination laws, this would cure their
constitutional infirmity. 1
9
Thus, Gellman's thoughtifli and influential'" analysis is subject to
serious criticism. There remains, then, a need to adequately distinguish
hate crimes statutes from employment discrimination laws.
3. Inextricably Intertwined Motive and Conduct
Hate crimes statutes, targeting as they do certain thoughts and
motives, are content-based.193 Because content-based statutes are subject
to strict scrutiny,"94 a court should strike them down unless they are
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.' Assuming,
11 Grannis, supra note 151, at 196 (quoting International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (citation omitted)).
'n See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. 1992) (citing Gellman with
approval); State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 453 (Ohio 1992) (citing Gellman with
approval); In re Joshua H., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Gellman with
disapproval).
' See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
195 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402 (1989) (holding that under the facts of
the case, flag burning is protected speech).
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arguendo, that the enumerated harms of hate crimes form a compelling
state interest, there remains the requirement that the statutes be narrowly
tailored to meet that interest without unduly suppressing free expression
or thought. It is here, more than anywhere, that hate crimes laws are
fatally flawed. In this line of analysis, a distinction becomes apparent
between hate crimes statutes and employment discrimination statutes.
An analogy is illustrative. Imagine a patient suffering from cancer of
the liver and a surgeon deliberating about the wisdom of operating to
excise the tumor. In large measure, the surgeon's determination will be
guided by the extent to which the tumor has metastasized; the more
confined the tumor, the easier it will be to remove it without damaging
healthy tissue. If the cancer has spread too much, surgery reaches a point
of diminishing returns; the surgeon can remove the entire tumor, but so
much healthy and necessary liver tissue will be damaged that there is no
net benefit to the patient.196
Now, consider the area of expressive conduct. O'Brien97 teaches
that, in a strict scrutiny setting, encroachment upon free expression is to
be allowed only if supported by compelling state interests and minimal
intrusion."9 In this sense, the burden on free expression is akin to the
tumor. Just as the surgeon will operate to remove a tumor if the benefit
outweighs the damage to the healthy organ, so should a legal analyst seek
to extract a burden on free thought if the extraction will not destroy the
utility of the criminal law attempt to forestall the conduct.
In the case of hate crimes legislation, the extraction can be performed
because the line of demarcation is pronounced: the underlying criminal
prohibition, perhaps assault, is akeady a punishable offense. Thus, the
offense to the First Amendment embodied in the enhanced penalty is
easily separable and should be excised. In the model below, Figure A
represents a hate crime. The bias motivation is distinct from the
underlying conduct-a point highlighted by the fact that hate crimes laws
require a predicate offense. The patterns in the boxes in Figure A are
distinct. In the same sense, the components of hate crimes are distinct,
forming almost a mathematical equation: Predicate Offense + Hate = Hate
Crime.
' Recognizing that this description may be rather over-simplified, I offer it only for
purposes of comparison to the theme of the Article.
197 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).







The same cannot be said for employment discrimination statutes. There
is no predicate offense required since hiring, promotion, and discharge
decisions are not ordinarily legally proscribable acts. 99 Therefore, the
underlying conduct is subject to legal review only when there is an illicit
motive. In this way, in the context of employment discrimination statutes,
' In so saying, it is understood that not all employment situations are at-will and that






the conduct and the motive are inextricably intertwined, as illustrated
above in Figure B. Just as the patterns in Figure B merge, so do the act
and the motive in improper employment discrimination. The compelling
societal interest in preventing employment discrimination can only be
achieved by reference to the motive (or by a disparate impact claim). °0
By contrast, hate crimes can be and have been constrained by the
requisite legal prohibitions against the underlying offenses in hate crimes
statutes.20' Thus, the incursion into free expression is hardly "inciden-
tal," as required by O'Brien.0 2
Returning to the cancer surgery analogy, a surgeon most likely would
elect to extract an easily removable, localized tumor because the
surrounding healthy tissue would be unaffected. In the same sense, the
First Amendment affront of hate crimes legislation can be removed while
still leaving valid, enforceable criminal laws to prevent opprobrious
conduct. The surgeon, confronted by a tumor that has metastasized
through the organ, is less likely to operate because the healthy tissue
would almost certainly be sacrificed. Similarly, the restriction of free
expression could not be removed from employment discrimination
statutes without rendering them impotent.
There is, then, a meaningful distinction between employment
discrimination statutes and hate crimes laws. In sum, hate crimes laws are
not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest, and their
Supra note 191 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
202 Several law professors and writers echoed this idea in their anicus brief in
Mitchell.
In this sense, anti-discrimination laws are analogous to the law upheld by
this Court in [O'Brien]. There this Court held that a law making it a crime to
destroy one's draft card is constitutional, despite the fact that such destruction
had been employed as part of a political protest. This was because "when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important or substantial governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms."
The same cannot be said, however, of hate crime sentence enhancement
laws. In the case of hate crimes, the government's legitimate interest in
regulating the non-speech element is satisfied by punishing an individual's
criminal acts. No further need-short of the illegitimate desire to punish
objectionable beliefs-therefore justifies sentence enhancement on the basis of
the defendant's political motivation.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Larry Alexander, Ralph Brown, Alan Dershowitz, David
Goldberger, Gerald Gunther, Nat Hentoff and Diane Zimmerman, supra note 132, at 12.
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rejection on that basis need not endanger the constitutional underpinnings
of employment discrimination laws.
E. An Alternative Approach: The New Judicial Federalism
In 1977, Associate Justice William Brennan suggested that state
courts, many of them chafing under the increasingly conservative
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, pay heed to their own
state constitutions. 3 In the later years of the Burger Court, and through
the present tenure of the Rehnquist Court, state courts have increasingly
followed Brennan's admonition,2°' the result being what has been
termed "The New Judicial Federalism" ("NJF")."5 Because state courts
considering challenges to state hate crimes statutes are not limited to
federal constitutional considerations, the determination of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell does not end the inquiry.
State courts have long relied almost exclusively on the Federal
Constitution in examining constitutional questions."6 This reliance is
due, principally, to the Supremacy Clause0 7 and the abundance of
precedent on almost all federal constitutional questions. The Supremacy
Clause mandates, inter alia, that no state law may run counter to the
Federal Constitution or federal laws."' The Clause does not, of course,
forbid states from offering their citizens more rights or more extensive
rights than the Federal Constitution offers-the existence and extent of
federal rights being subject to judicial interpretation.0 9 The NJF has
been an oasis of sorts for liberals, as it provides a mechanism for
recognizing rights that the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly ques-
2 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection ofIndividual Rights,
90 HA'v. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
' See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mica.
L. REV. 761, 780 (1992) (surveying state cases utilizing state constitutions).
2" See Donald E. Batterson, Comment, A Trend Ephemeral? Eternal? Neither?: A
Durational Look at the New Judicial Federalism, 42 EMORY L.J. 209 (1993).
' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Allen, 549 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1990) (evaluating the
case under the U.S. Supreme Court's Aquilar-Spinelli test for free speech cases).
'" This Constitution, and the law of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
2M Id.
2 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tioned. ° However, while state courts are looking to state constitutions
more frequently, the practice is not without its critics.2 1
State hate crimes statutes provide appropriate cases for application of
the New Judicial Federalism. Although proponents of the NJF have most
frequently applied it in the context of criminal procedure,"' this is
presumably because of the U.S. Supreme Court's increasing refusal to
recognize and enforce even long-standing rights in that arena 1  There
10 For example, in 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on the Pennsylvania
Constitution to reverse a well-known murder conviction because of prosecutorial
misconduct. Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992) (In 1979, high school
principal Jay Smith was convicted of murdering a teacher and her two children. Id.). The
court determined that Pennsylvania's double jeopardy provision barred retrial of the
defendant and, consequently, discharged the defendant. Id. at 325. Because the court
expressly relied on the state constitution, the Commonwealth could not seek federal
review of the decision. See infra notes 230-34.
2 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 204; Ralph Adam Fine, '72ew Federalism" in the
Post-Brennan Era, LEGAL TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1990, at 31. Fine, a judge of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals, argues that the New Judicial Federalism is essentially an unjustifiable
form of judicial activism aimed at initiating social change without legislative action. Id.
The argument is much like that leveled at the U.S. Supreme Court during the tenure of
Chief Justice Earl Warren. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation,
Character, and Experience, 72 B. U. L. REV. 747 (1992).
2 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. 1992); State v.
Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 529 (Alaska 1993).
2 Two noteworthy examples are the recent cases in the areas of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination and the area of the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), the
Supreme Court held that an arrested person may not be subjected to custodial intenoga-
tion without being advised of his right to counsel. Id. In the quarter century since
Miranda, however, the Court has virtually allowed the exceptions to swallow the rule.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (fact that earlier confession was gained
without Miranda warnings does not taint later, post-Miranda confession); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used
to impeach a defendant's testimony).
The Exclusionary Rule is a judicially created rule that, at its inception, required the
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (applying the Exclusionary Rule in the
federal courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the Exclusionary Rule to
state courts). Again, the Court has created numerous exceptions to the rule such that its
continuing vitality remains in jeopardy. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (rule not proven to deter police
misconduct and in need of narrowing); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)
(product of an improper search not suppressed if police acted in good-faith reliance on
a defective search warrant); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment admissible in federal civil trial). As it dies a "death
by a thousand cuts," the Exclusionary Rule will not be mourned by all. See, e.g., RALPH
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is, however, no reason for state courts to restrict the federalism analysis to the
criminal procedure arena, and many have not.214 The U.S. Supreme Court's
determination that the hate crimes statutes are not offensive to the Federal
Constitution in no way restricts the power of a state court to find a particular
statute forbidden under the state constitution. Again, a state is always free to
provide more rights than the Federal Constitution, but not fewer? 5
There have been a number of notable recent cases employing the NJF.
For example, in Kentucky v. Wasson," the Kentucky Supreme Court
applied the state constitution to the case of a man who solicited an undercover
police officer to engage in "deviate sexual intercourse," as defined in a
Kentucky statute.2 7 In essence, the case presented a question of whether a
state could proscribe homosexual conduct? 8 Six years earlier, the United
States Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy statute in Bowers v.
Hardwic 219 refusing to extend substantive due process protection to
homosexual conduct. ° In Wasson, however, the Kentucky court looked
not at the Federal Constitution, but at the Kentucky Constitution.
§ 1. All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent
and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: First: The right of
enjoying and defending their lives and liberties .... Third: The right of
seeking and pursuing their safety and happiness ....
§ 2. Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of
freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest majority?'
The court concluded that homosexuals should be regarded as a protected class
for purposes of equal protection analysis under the state constitution.'
ADAM FINE, THE ESCAPE OF THE GuILTY (1986) (arguing that the rule is all too often
employed in cases in which a defendant is clearly guilty). But see Kathleen M. Ghreichi,
Note, James v. Illinois: An Unexpected Departure from the Steady Erosion of the Fourth
Amendment Excusionauy Rule, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 839, 840 (1991).
214 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that classifications by
sex are suspect for equal protection purposes); see also 600 West 115th St. Corp. v. Von
Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930, 938 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that statements made by defendants
at a public hearing were constitutionally protected).
215 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
216 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992), reh'g denied (1993).
217 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1991).
218 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487.
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
z' Id. at 190-96.
2' KY. BILL OF RIGHTS, KY. CONST. art. I, § 1-2.
m Wasson, 842 S.W.2d at 501.
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With that categorization, the statute had to pass a substantial governmen-
tal interest/rational basis test.
We need not speculate as to whether male and/or female homosexuals
will be allowed status as a protected class for equal protection purposes
if and when the U.S. Supreme Court confronts this issue. They are a
separate and identifiable class for Kentucky constitutional law analysis
because no class of persons can be discriminated against under the
Kentucky Constitution 3
The Hawaii Supreme Court followed an analysis similar to that of the
Kentucky Supreme Court in concluding that a state statute forbidding
same-sex marriage may violate that state's equal protection provision3
The Hawaii court held that the Hawaii Constitution required that sex be
regarded as a suspect classification for purposes of equal protection.
Finding that a statute prohibiting marriage because of gender is subject
to strict scrutiny, the Hawaii court remanded the case for a determination
of whether the statute could withstand the heightened scrutiny.'
In the free expression area, few decisions have been based on state
constitutional law. 6 There are, however, a number of provisions in
state constitutions that implicate freedom of thought. The Pennsylvania
Constitution, for example, begins with a Declaration of Rights:
Sec. 7. Freedom of press and speech; libels
The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake
to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of
=Id.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993).
Id. at 62; see also HAw. CONST. art. I, § 3. More recent state cases relying on state
constitutions include In re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the
Minnesota Constitution grants greater protection than that recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991)) and In re J.W.T., No.
D-1742; 36 Tex. Sup. 1 1126 (Texas June 30, 1993) (holding that putative father has a
right under the Texas Constitution to rebut presumption of legitimacy because Texas "due
course of law" provision is broader than federal due process guarantee).
" But see State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 560 (Or. 1992). The idea of applying
state constitutional law to federal First Amendment questions is not novel. See Monrad
G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND.
L. REV. 620, 642 (1951) (concluding that reference to state constitutions by courts was
disappointing); see also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial Federalism: Current Trends and
Long-Term Prospects, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1053, 1054 (1992); Hans Linde, E
Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165, 178 (1984).
[Vol. 82
4HATE CRIMES
government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The
free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights
of man, and every citizen may fre!y speak, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."7
Similarly, the Indiana Constitution holds:
Sec. 9. Free speech and writing
No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and
opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any
subject whatever but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be
responsible.?"
It is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest specific doctrinal arguments
for application of state constitutions to hate crimes statutes.' 9 However,
many of the provisions are sufficiently broad to support interpretations and
analyses of hate crimes legislation that are less deferential than that of the
U.S. Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court has the power to review a decision of a state's
highest court, provided that the opinion is based upon the U.S. Constitution
or federal law."0 In Michigan v. Long, 1 the Court noted that it would
not review a state case if the state court included a "plain statement" that the
decision relied on "adequate and independent" state law grounds."
PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
" IND. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Wisconsin Constitution
includes similar language:
Section 3. Free speech; libel
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
sfibjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.
Wisc. CONST. art. I, § 3. Had the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on this language in
Mitchell, there would have been no basis for federal review and the rejection of the
statute would have been final.
' Proponents of the hate crimes statutes will likely point to language such as that
found in the Pennsylvania provision: "... . being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."
PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7. Of note is the decision of the Oregon Supreme Court in State v.
Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 564 (Or. 1992), in which the court upheld the state hate crimes
provision against both state and federal constitutional attack.
2'0 See Herb v. Pitcaim, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). The Court statec "Our only power over
state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal
rights." Id. at 125-26.
2 1 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
21 Id. at 1041-42.
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Otherwise, the Court would presume that federal grounds underlay the
state determination.' Hence, Long provides a caveat to state judges
who would be practitioners of the NJF: If you seek to avoid federal
review, expressly state that your holding arises from the state constitu-
tion.
There are those who will see this call to the NJF as advocating
judicial defiance of legislative wil23 5 To an extent, it is just that-as is
almost any determination that a duly enacted statute offends the federal
or state Constitution. The importance of legislatures to democracy is that
they reflect most directly the will of the majority. Often, such responsive-
ness is a virtue 36 There are times, however, when it is a detriment.3 7
Statutes that purport to stem the rising tide of hate crimes are attractive
a priori. There are few in our society who would champion the content
of hate speech or the commission of crime based on hate, just as there are
few who would support flag burning. Those legislators who might
raise some of the many arguments against such statutes on constitutional
grounds are likely put off by visions of the inevitable newspaper
headlines: "Senator Dogma Opposes Hate Crimes Measure." First
Amendment arguments are often the most difficult and unpopular to
make.39 That being the case, the will of the legislature is not always
a well-reasoned will. The raison d'etre of a constitution is to set forth
immutable guidelines that will withstand the vagaries of time and popular
whim. 4 Utilizing state constitutions to strike down hate crimes laws,
then, is not so much an act of judicial activism as an effort to remedy
2 Id.
z See, e.g., American Trucking Associations v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990); In
re E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 780 (Minn. 1993).
23S See Fine, supra note 211, at 31.
26 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000(h)(6) (1988).
2 7 For example, the Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990)
sought to reverse the Supreme Court opinion in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989),
which invalidated Texas' flag desecration statute. The federal legislation, ill-advised and
constitutionally doomed, was the result of public outcry. See Fine, supra note 145, at 777-
79 (describing the public outcry over the Johnson decision). A year later, the Supreme
Court struck down the federal enactment. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
'a See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Fine, supra note
145, at 802.
9 See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978) (regarding a Nazi
march in Skokie, Illinois), cert. denied sub nom., 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
240 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49, 69 (1803).
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unconstitutional, poorly considered legislative action. Justice Hugo Black
a former senator, aptly wrote in 1952:
The motives behind the state laws may have been to do good. But the
same can be said about most laws making opinions punishable as
crimes. History indicates that urges to do good have led to the burning
of books and even to the burning of "witches." '241
It is, of course, important to note that passage of a federal hate crimes
law would render much of the foregoing New Judicial Federalism
discussion moot, at least in the context of the federal law and its
enforcement. NJF adherents utilize state constitutions to strike down state
laws.242 A federal statute, however, could not be found invalid by
reference to a state constitution-the Supremacy Clause so guarantees. 3
CONCLUSION
There is a danger in voicing criticism of hate crimes statutes. In a
society of sound bites and limited concentration, the public-including
academics-all too often simplifies issues so as to obscure an important
nuance.' We append labels where fuller description, although neces-
2" Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274 (Black, J., dissenting). Black held an
absolutist view of First Amendment rights, believing that the words "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press" mean that Congress shall
make no law, virtually without exception. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 148 (1979). During the 1970s, when the Burger Court struggled to agree on
an appropriate standard for what was obscene and, therefore, not constitutionally
protected, the Justices would gather in the basement of the Supreme Court building to
view challenged films. Justices Black and William 0. Douglas declined to attend,
asserting that no matter what the content, the films merited protection. Id. at 234. "If I
want to go see that film," Black said, "I should pay my money." Id. See also Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J. concurring) (holding that a city ordinance
making mere possession of an obscene book a crime, even in the absence of any
knowledge of the obscenity, was a violation of the First Amendment).
22 See supra notes 215-29.
23 See supra note 207.
The debate about abortion rights provides a good illustration. The issue in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was not whether abortion was moral but whether a state
could constitutionally deprive a woman of the option to abort a pregnancy. Over-
simplification of the issue has made murky that distinction, so that many who count
themselves as "pro-life" are, in reality, "pro-choice." They believe abortion is wrong but
they also believe it is for each woman to choose. Many who oppose abortion rights are
quick to label their opponents "pro-abortion," when, in fact, many are not in favor of
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sary to proper understanding, would be burdensome.2" s In the hate
crimes context, those who oppose legislation must bear the risk of being
labelled as somehow in favor of hate crimes. 46 In truth, hate crimes
legislation opponents recognize the egregious harm of ethnic and racial
intimidation but fear more the slow-or not so slow-erosion of critical
constitutional rights.'
abortion but are instead opposed to state intervention in the decision.
"4 I must accept some small measure of responsibility as, at one time, I worked as
a television news anchor and reporter.
4 In arguing against hate crimes laws, I recognize that codified penalties are only
part of the issue. When they impose sentences, judges necessarily consider a wide range
of issues. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Given that it is impossible to read
a judge's mind, it is likely that a range of impermissible considerations form the bases for
sentences. Beyond that, juries, even if not so instructed, may discern certain facts from
the evidence and use those facts to decide guilt where otherwise they might not. It is not
a new prospect. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The'Influence of a
Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 7217 (1992) (describing Justice Marshall's stories of
defending black criminal defendants in the South in the 1940s when conviction by white
juries was all but certain); see also ERNEsT J. GAINEs, A LESSON BEFORE DYING (1993)
(giving fictional account of young black man who was found guilty of capital murder
almost immediately after the jury began its deliberations).
.. It is reminiscent of Brutus' proclamation in Julius Caesar:. "Not that I loved Caesar
less but that I loved Rome more." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act III,
Scene 2. Further, regardless of judicial approval, as Wisconsin Justice Shirley
Abrahamson noted, the statutes are not likely to be effective. Hate can hardly be
legislated out of existence. 485 N.W.2d 807, 818-19 (Wis. 1992) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
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